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RETHINKING GROUPISM: AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO THE POSTMODERN STRATEGY 
MATTHEW LATELLAT 
Groupism is a broader, more comprehensive concept for nationalism and other 
forms of group association. The existing division of the world into nation-states 
and the pervasiveness of groupist thought significantly contribute to the 
problems of war and global poverty. Current postmodernist theories that 
reject universal norms perpetuate groupist thinking. The attempts of Critical 
Race Theorists to support the interests of minority groups are shown to rely on 
a groupist rationale when considered from a globalist perspective. The 
problematic grounding of postmodernist theory as well as the inherently 
pernicious and exclusionary element to groupist thinking suggest the need for 
an alternative approach. It is argued that a proper theoretical foundation 
involves the acceptance of universal norms, while drawing on utilitarian 
modes of analysis. It is further argued that a non-exclusionary globalist 
perspective must be adopted if humanity is ever to address effectively the 
problems of war and poverty. 
Le groupisme est un concept plus large et plus comprehensif que celui de 
nationalisme ou autres formes d'association. La presente division politique du 
monde en nation-etat ainsi que la conviction de courant de pense groupiste 
contribuent de faron significative aux problemes de guerre et de pauvrete. 
Certaines theories contemporaines post-modernistes, qui rejettent les normes 
universelles, perpituent le courant de pense groupiste. Jl est demontre que, 
analysees dans une perspective globale, les tentatives des Theoriciens Critiques 
des Races voulant supporter les intirets des groupes minoritaires se basent sur 
les fondements du courant de pense groupiste. Le probleme de base en 
matiere de post-modernisme de meme que les elements pernicieux et 
exclusionnaires du courant de pense groupiste suggerent qu'il y a un besoin 
pour une approche alternative. fl est soutenu qu 'une theorie de base 
adequate implique !'acceptation de normes universelles, tout en construisant 
des modes d'analyse utilitaire. Jl est egalement soutenu qu 'une perspective 
globale non-exclusionnaire doit etre adoptee si le genre humain desire 
adresser les problemes de guerre et de pauvrete. 
t B.A. (Western), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). 
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Perhaps in heaven, there is laid up a pattern of it, which he 
who desired may behold, and beholding, may set his own 
house in order. But whether such an one exists or will ever 
exist in fact is no matter; for he will live after the manner 
of that city, having nothing to do with any other. 
Plato, The Republic, Book IX 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about a paradox. From within a virtual maelstrom of 
conflicting concepts, I will attempt to pursue the single purpose of 
developing a theory in response to the following question: to what 
extent is the existing diversity in human approaches to social orga-
nization1 a positive reality to be encouraged? The question arises out 
of the need to reconcile two conflicting intuitive sentiments.2 The 
reconciliation of this tension holds far-reaching implications for 
one's attitude toward myriad different political problems cur-
rently confounding the leaders of the world. 
The first of these intuitive sentiments directs me to posit a 
proposition about what is commonly referred to as "nationalism," 
but which I will assess under the more general label of "groupism." 
Groupism, I will argue, is a more basic organizing principle of so-
ciety-both historically and, perhaps, anthropologically-than 
"nationalism." My working definition of "groupism" is as follows: 
the acceptance of the notion that humanity is naturally divided into 
groups, each of which possess their own set of particular traits which 
a priori should be cultivated; and that each of these groups are enti-
tled to a degree of autonomy from the rest of humanity, including 
1 This is not a question about diversity of social organization in the economic 
sense as displayed by approaches ranging from market-driven capitalism to state-
controlled Marxism. Nor is it an inquiry into degrees of democratic freedom 
accorded to various collectivities of peoples around the globe-though both 
economics and democracy may ultimately come into play as the limitations of 
groupist thinking are probed. Rather, it is a question about diversity of social 
organization at its most fundamental level, namely, the very separateness of 
groups for purposes of governance. 
2 I identify the source of this inquiry as being intuitive for the purpose of 
highlighting the notion that exploration of our extra-rational ideas can be a 
worthwhile enterprise. Arrival at an opinion that is both logical and coherent is 
often preceded by the need to confront two or more seemingly contradictory 
sentiments. 
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the right to govern themselves and thus determine the laws by which 
the group will conduct its affairs. I will assert that in its many dif-
ferent manifestations, groupism has been necessarily pernicious and 
has resulted in negative implications for the flourishing of human-
ity. 
The second of these intuitive sentiments stems from a recogni-
tion that the existing state structure, coupled with the hegemonic 
claims of conflicting ideologies, poses a situation whereby the po-
litical and cultural interests of minority groups are continuously in 
jeopardy and in need of protection. This protection comes in two 
forms: self-help and state assistance. "Self help" involves the minor-
ity group asserting its distinct group status as something inherently 
positive. This distinctiveness is used as a vehicle for promoting the 
interests of the minority group vis-a-vis the dominant group by 
which the minority feels threatened. "State assistance" involves the 
dominant group allowing for, and facilitating, institutional reform 
and/or the distribution of political power and resources, financial 
or otherwise. 
Much of current academic thought-particularly in the area of 
Critical Race Theory-is consistent with the second intuitive sen-
timent; that is, a groupist framework tied to the exisiting state 
structure is uncritically presumed. The negative implications of na-
tionalism, on the other hand, are not widely recognized. Generally, 
nationalism is either positively viewed as "patriotism" or, within 
the specific context of racial or cultural minorities, "realistically" 
accepted as a necessary and natural fostering of communitarian ties. 
In either case, it is commonly thought that the concept need not be 
considered always and everywhere to be problematic. 
The dichotomization of nationalism into the pernicious and the 
beneficial is largely rejected by the thesis which I will put forward. 
Groupist mentality it will be argued, is singularly responsible for 
fostering a prejudicial parochialism that leads human beings, 
against our natural instincts, to become socialized in a manner 
detrimental to the well-being of much of humanity. I will argue 
that we are indoctrinated to accord an inordinately high value to the 
interests of those members of the human family who happen to exist 
within our own "group," as contrasted to those who happen to exist 
outside the parameters of this group. 
Groupist thinking in general, and group rights in particular, are 
widely presented as vehicles for positive change. Little or no explo-
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ration of the possible pejorative conceptual underpinnings of sepa-
rateness and divisiveness is offered. Little attention is paid to 
achieving greater equality for groups or individuals in international 
society. Rather, equality arguments are aimed at working within the 
existing state structure without considering how this approach may 
well serve to perpetuate global inequalities. 
The challenge, then, is to formulate a position that adopts a 
holistic, long-term approach to the improvement of the human con-
dition. The vast majority of the academic inquiry into minority 
rights seems content to advocate solutions aimed at redressing spe-
cific current inequalities without much thought cast toward the long-
term future of human relations on a global scale. Injustice needs to 
be addressed on both a micro and a macro level. If we continue to 
ignore systemic obstacles to establishing a more just world, or fail 
to inquire seriously into how the micro-groupist problems facing 
the world are connected to the macro-groupist structure, we are 
doomed to continue implementing ad hoc, marginally effective at-
tempts at harmonizing human relations. 
Given the difficulty of effecting even moderate reform, to pre-
sume to espouse holistic solutions entailing radical departures in 
current thought would appear to display both the most naive sort of 
idealism and an incredible arrogance. There may be some truth to 
such an appraisal of my approach. However, there is more to this di-
vergence of approaches than one side being thought to be "too ideal-
istic" and the other being thought to be "too fatalistic." What might 
be at stake are our opinions about humanity's ability to determine 
how to avoid self-annihilation. Furthermore, my attraction to a 
more holistic approach stems in large part from another intuitive 
sentiment: specifically, the maxim that the only problems are those 
caused by solutions. 3 This particularly holds true when an ad hoc, 
"muddling through" approach is deliberately adopted. 
Nonetheless, these arguments must be assessed on their merits. 
The suppression of minority "voices" by dominant groups 
within the existing state structure, and dissatisfaction with ap-
proaches to achieving equality with the dominant group that are seen 
as over-emphasizing distributive justice,4 have produced a situation 
3 C.H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1973) at 13. 
4 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) at 15. 
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which has been viewed as requiring an alternative approach. As a re-
sult, academic arguments have been marshalled which focus on the 
inherent value in the idea of difference itself. Diversity for diversi-
ty's sake has been elevated to the status of a de facto natural law 
norm within the realm of Critical Race Theories. The problem lies 
in the fact that these theories simultaneously accept as an article of 
faith5 that there are no universal norms or at least that it is undesir-
able to suppose that there are. 
This paper does not attempt anything approaching a comprehen-
sive survey of Critical Race Theory. Indeed, such an undertaking 
would be both beyond the paper's scope and would divert the focus 
from the globalist nature of my thesis. Rather, I will attempt to 
display the failure of these theories on their own terms as well as 
point to how acting on these theories unwittingly perpetuates the in-
equality of different groups around the world. I will demonstrate 
that the "solutions" proposed by Critical Race Theory are by neces-
sity short-term and that they fail to think adequately upon the future 
of all humanity. 
In contrast to the approach to ethnic and cultural diversity cur-
rently fashionable among legal theorists, I will posit an alternative 
thinking, a "Third Way" that negotiates the terrain which lies be-
tween the "melting pot" assimilationist paradigm and the 
"multicultural" diversity-as-virtue paradigm that seem to have de-
fined the parameters of the debate thus far. The specific challenges 
of such a task are as numerous as they are daunting. The most central 
of these are as follows: addressing questions raised by the individu-
alism/communitarianism dichotomy; positing a redefinition of 
"culture" in a manner consistent with a globalist ethos; elucidating a 
justifiable rationale for the meta-ethical foundations of the position 
being advocated; and explicating the failure of postmodernist legal 
scholarship to provide Critical Race Theory with a moral founda-
tion from which to approach its attempts at reconstituting an ap-
praisal of" difference." 
I am aware that many weighty tomes have sought to answer these 
questions. I do not suggest that the answers presented here will do 
5 My use of the word "faith" (within the context of describing the rationale of 
a school of thought which frequently appears distinctly nihilistic in tone) is a 
deliberate attempt at using irony to draw attention to the inability of Critical 
Legal Theorists to engage in reconstruction without appearing to embrace the 
existence of universal norms. 
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justice to the breadth of the issues. It is hoped, however, that this 
work might serve as a skeletal exposition of an alternative view-
point. 
II. WHEREBY THE AUTHOR PRESENTS THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS FOR HIS THESIS 
1. Natural Law 
In this paper I unabashedly embrace the existence of universal 
norms. I begin with the assumption that the rightness or wrongness 
of an action is not dependent upon any individual's or any group's 
appraisal of it as being such. Individuals and groups of individuals 
have in the past made, and will undoubtedly continue to make, in-
correct, ethnocentric suppositions that their experientially and cul-
turally determined assessment of something's moral praise worthi-
ness or blame worthiness is a reflection of a universal norm. Such er-
rors do not undermine the veracity of the claim that universal norms 
do in fact exist; rather they simply attest to the difficulty 
(impossibility?) of determining the precise content of these norms. 
To pander to the skeptic's insistence on an unreasonably strin-
gent epistemological standard would result in a sort of ethical and, 
by extension, political paralysis that any polity would find unac-
ceptable. Advocates of the existence of universal ethical norms have 
always acknowledged the formidable challenge presented by at-
tempting to ascertain what the norms are without allowing this to 
draw the existence of the norms into question.6 I will explore the 
potential effects of this considerable challenge later in the paper. 
2. Utilitarianism 
The marriage of an acceptance of pre-established universal norms 
with an ethical theory based upon the principle of looking to the 
consequences of an act to determine its moral predicates may, at 
first blush, appear to be a somewhat unnatural coupling. One theory 
assumes the existence of fixed, immutable rules, understood as be-
ing established prior to the commission of any act. The other insists 
6 The quotation from Plato's Republic at the beginning of this paper is an 
example of precisely such an acknowledgment. Aquinas also recognized this by 
distinguishing between human beings' emulation of universal norms (which he 
called Natural Law) and these norms themselves (which he called Eternal Law). 
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that we look to the consequences of an act, which of necessity tem-
porally follow actions. However, when one considers that these two 
theories pertain to two different elements of moral theory, their 
complimentary nature becomes more apparent. I have already men-
tioned the inherent difficulty that people have in apprehending the 
content of universal norms. As it is less difficult (if still challeng-
ing) to assess the consequences for a society of the enforcement of a 
given rule or set of rules, utilitarian calculi may be effectively used 
to inform the debate over the determination of which rules might be 
accurate reflections of universal norms. 
R. B. Brandt has put forward a form of utilitarian theory, which 
he calls the "Ideal Moral Code Theory,"7 that envisages just such a 
combination of natural law theory and utilitarianism. It is impor-
tant to note that Brandt was not advocating what is known as "act 
utilitarianism" whereby "an act is objectively right if no other act 
the agent could perform would produce better consequences."8 
Rather, he advocated a particular form of "rule utilitarianism": 
An act is right if and only if it would not be prohibited 
by the moral code ideal for the society; and an agent is 
morally blameworthy (praiseworthy) for an act if, and to 
the degree that, the moral code ideal in that society 
would condemn (praise) him for it.9 
Brandt's theory diverges from a similar theory put forward by 
John Stuart Mill on the approach to be taken should a conflict arise 
between two rules contained in a moral code. 10 Mill advocated use 
of the act utilitarian principle to resolve such conflicts, but this ap-
proach presents problems at both the theoretical level as well as in 
practical application. On the theoretical level, forms of rule utili-
tarianism that employ an act utilitarian conflict resolution mecha-
nism are left vulnerable to the charge that rule utilitarianism ulti-
7 R. B. Brandt, "Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism" in 
K. Rogerson, ed., Introduction to Ethical Theory (Fort Worth, Texas: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1991) 81 at 86. 
8 Ibid at 83. 
9 Ibid at 86. 
1 O Inconsistencies m a utility-maximizing code may seem to be an 
impossibility as such a code would be expected to be internally coherent. 
However, as we have seen in the reality of conflicting rights, human expressions 
of ideals are limited such that mechanisms for resolution of conflicting ideals 
are necessary. 
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mately collapses into act utilitarianism. At the practical level, what 
this means is that rules which are taken to be part of the moral code 
of society are robbed of their authority. Reliance upon the rules is 
undermined by the possibility of a utilitarian veto trumping any 
rule whenever a conflict arises. Furthermore, this would occur de-
spite any potentially important relationship which the rule might 
stand in vis-a-vis any other rules. 
The irony of this situation is that a non-utilitarian conflict re-
solving principle must be followed in order to maximize utility. 
The conflict resolving principle which Brandt puts forward is 
a directive to do what an intelligent person who had fully 
interiorized the rest of the ideal moral system would feel 
best satisfied with doing. 11 
Whether or not this is a satisfactory alternative is less important 
than what it may tell us about utilitarianism. In effect, utilitarian-
ism (or at least Brandt's minimally problematic formulation of it) 
is less an ethical theory that purports to tell you or me how to act 
morally, than it is a theory which explains what the effect of a soci-
ety acting morally would be. 
I am not suggesting that through utilitarian analysis disputes 
over the rules by which a society should live somehow will be miti-
gated; undoubtedly, disputes will continue to arise. However, an 
important change in the nature of these disputes would take place. 
By remaining mindful of the fact that the best set of rules is in-
tended to maximize the overall utility of a society, closer attention 
is likely to be paid to those members of society whose interests 
have been marginalized the most. Though the interests of similarly 
situated individuals are to be given similar moral weight, the least 
fortunate members of society with the lowest utility are most ur-
gently in need of assistance. Thus, a rule that increased the marginal 
utility of a privileged group in a society while failing to assist a 
less privileged group would not be an acceptable rule to imple-
ment. Utilitarian calculus, when properly carried out, reaffirms the 
equality of all individuals while taking into account the greater 
value of achieving increases in the utility of the worst off in society 
than similar increases for those already in a more fortunate position. 
Finally, I should mention that a familiar criticism of utilitari-
anism is that it lends itself, perhaps more so than other moral theo-
11 Supra note 7 at 91. 
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ries, to chronic misapplication. Individual self-interest is not fil-
tered out when people justify their actions on seemingly utilitarian 
grounds. The result is that the actual utility maximizing action may 
fail to be identified because the individual has skewed the calculus 
by not remaining impartial in her or his appraisal of the various op-
tions she or he might be faced with when making a moral decision. 
This shortcoming is more applicable to act utilitarianism than it is 
to a theory which includes a moral code because the code serves as a 
guide to assist in distinguishing the utility of the self from the util-
ity of all. 
1. War 
III. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES 
TO MAXIMIZING THE UTILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITY 
A place to stay, 
Enough to eat, 
Somewhere old heroes 
Shuffle safely down the street 
Where you can speak 
Out loud 
About your doubts and fears 
And, what's more; 
No one ever disappears, 
You never hear their standard issue 
Kicking in your door. 
You can relax 
On both sides of the tracks, 
And maniacs 
Don't blow holes 
In bandsmen by remote control. 
And everyone has recourse to the law, 
And no one kills the children anymore. 
"The Gunner's Dream" by Pink Floyd 
The untold suffering humanity has brought upon ourselves through 
armed conflict stands undoubtedly as our greatest moral failure. So 
relentless has been our compulsion to wage war on one another that it 
appears to us beyond our control. Mass murder writ large has been 
accepted as a fact of life simply because it has always been a part of 
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human history. Such reasoning, however, amounts to acquiescing to a 
doomed future. Rather than accept humanity's propensity to kill 
one another in geopolitical conflict as an unfortunate symptom of 
our flawed nature, I propose to examine the possible forces at play 
which might be unnaturally causing us to engage in this utility-
negating activity. 
In an inquiry into the nature and causes of war, Joseph Margolis 
has made the following salient observation: 
The most striking and obvious feature of war is the gen -
eral destruction of human lives on the part of people who 
do not know their victims personally, who profess to be 
opposed to wanton killing, and who nevertheless firmly 
believe themselves justified in the name of principle not 
directly construed in terms of mere personal 
advantage. 12 
The "principles" prompting groups to go to war with one another 
can differ from conflict to conflict. One factor that is invariably 
present, however, is the sense of affiliation with a particular subset-
rather than with the whole-of humanity. So basic is this groupist 
notion to the reality of war that it is actually impossible to com-
prehend the concept of war without also understanding the sentiment 
behind groupism. While wars can be fought in the name of other 
principles, groupist sentiment provides the fuel to perpetuate the 
conflict often after common sense and reason demonstrate that all 
other strategic rationales have been exhausted. The ongoing war in 
the former Yugoslavia is testament to how a particularly odious 
manifestation of groupism can fuel hatred such that bloody conflict 
is further protracted in the name of" ethnic cleansing." 
In Personal Identity, National Identity and International 
Relations, William Bloom conducts a psychological inquiry into 
group affiliation and offers the following astute observation about 
the relationship between seeking one's individual identity through 
groupism and warfare: 
Anthropologically we are all of the same species and it is 
only chance that causes our birth in this or in that particu-
lar country. It is through the identification imperative 
12 J. Margolis, "War and Ideology" in V. Held, S. Morgenbesser, & T. Nagel, 
eds., Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974) 246 at 246. 
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that we then become psychologically linked with that 
countty. There is a poignant and awful innocence here-
for what begins as a blind psychological action, in which 
insecure human beings seek a necessaty psychological se-
curity, becomes in the tornado of political realities the 
fuel for mass mobilisation and total war. 13 
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The Vietnam War proved, among other things, that a democrat-
ically elected government cannot wage a foreign war over an indefi-
nite period of time in the face of strong opposition from its elec-
tors. Governments of democratic nation-states are thus inclined to 
influence the citizenry in such a way as to heighten the sense of group 
affiliation among the electorate. The strategic importance of 
groupist sentiment to modern war has, as E. J. Hobsbawm rightly 
observed, led to 
the question of the "nation," and the citizen's feelings to-
wards whatever he regarded as his "nation,'' "nationality" 
or other centre of loyalty, [being placed] at the top of the 
political agenda. 14 
We can thus begin to recognize that a principal cause of war is 
the structural manifestation of the groupist mentality, namely, the 
state system. By providing groupism with a structured framework 
in the form of the international law doctrine of state sovereignty, 
the anarchic nature of inter-state relations has been legitimized. By 
entrenching the concept of state sovereignty in the United Nations 
Charter15 (quite at odds with much of the rest of the document's 
provisions 16), legal credibility is lent to a sentiment which is of 
integral importance to war existing as a coherent concept. 
Philip Allott, an international lawyer and former British 
diplomat delivers a stinging indictment of the state system in his 
l3 W. Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations 
(Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 163. 
14 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge [England]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990)at 83. 
l5 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T. S. 1945 No. 7, 59 Stat. 
1031, 145 U.K.F.S. 805, art. 2(1), reads as follows: "The Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." 
l6 An example of this inconsistency is displayed in article 73, ibid., pertaining 
to Non-Self-Governing Territories. 
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treatise, Eunomia: New Order for a New World. 17 Allott asserts that 
the state system is "the greatest cause of war and of interminable 
self-destructive social struggle."18 He argues: 
[International law] has contributed next to nothing to the 
avoidance and resolution of such conflicts. On the con-
trary, it has fueled them with the perverted passions gen-
erated by its primitive categories of sovereignty and 
sovereignty over territory. 19 
Thus, quite understandably, our sensibilities are partially 
moulded by our institutions; likewise, our sensibilities help to 
mould our institutions. It is through this reciprocal exchange be-
tween ideas and their manifestations that humanity can either choose 
to live together in peace or remain torn apart by war. 
2. Poverty 
She's everybody's sister 
She's symbolic of our failure 
She's the one in fifty million 
Who can help us to be free 
Because she died on TV 
And I grieve for my sister. 
Roger Waters, "Watching TV" 
The level of grinding poverty under which much of the human fam-
ily subsists, while another segment of humanity enjoys material 
wealth far in excess of its actual needs, represents both a fundamen-
tal injustice as well as a fundamental failure to maximize human 
utility. The "developed" groups of the world have accepted that 
while it may be morally admirable to assist the destitute, such in-
stances of charity are not morally obligatory. 
Peter Singer has challenged this notion on utilitarian grounds, 
arguing that the distinction between charity and obligation is a 
specious one.20 Singer contends that it is not enough to say we are 
!7 P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order far a New World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
18 Ibid. at 330. 
19 Ibid. 
20 P. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" in G. Sher, ed., Moral 
Philosophy: Selected Readings (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1987) 595 
at 599. 
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only bound not to cause harm but rather we have an obligation to 
take positive steps to prevent harm. He writes: 
[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing any thing of com-
parable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.21 
As compelling as Singer's thesis may be, one is nevertheless left 
asking why individuals, many of whom upon contemplation would 
agree with his argument, have failed to act on it by foregoing such 
luxury items as television remote controls and automobiles de-
signed to accelerate at breakneck speeds. The easy answer is that the 
propensity of human beings to improve their marginal utility by X 
amount, rather than using the resources to assist someone else by 
I OOOX22 is a reflection of our flawed, self-interested nature and in-
ability to empathize with people whose life experiences differ so 
greatly from our own. To my mind, this answer merely begs the 
question: given that people are capable of displaying empathy as 
well as self-interest, what effect might the structures under which we 
live have on our propensity to act on the latter, rather than the for-
mer, motivation ? 
I submit that groupist mentality in general, and the most signif-
icant structural bulwark of this mentality, the doctrine of state 
sovereignty in particular, play a central role in the choices we make 
as individuals. They foster an inward-looking perspective; that 
which is related to the lives of members of one's own group is ac-
corded a disproportionately high value in moral terms, as com-
pared with those of members of other groups. 
There is an implicit acceptance of the comparative relativism 
between different groups with respect to what is considered good 
and bad. The popular media reinforce this debasing of group-tran-
scending standards. A plant closing or a massive fire is labelled a 
"tragedy" or "disaster," and, indeed, the people directly affected 
do suffer. The use of these labels, however, are usually not warranted 
21 Ibid. at 600. 
22 This is admittedly an evasion of the problem of comparative utilities. 
However, I am taking the liberty of assuming that the marginal utility which 
person A derives from spending the extra $10 000 or so to own a car which will 
be slightly faster, sleeker, and with more electronic gadgetry than another car, is 
equal to a tiny fraction of the utility to be derived from using that money to 
improve the life of impoverished person B (or more to the point, the lives of 
many other people). 
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when one considers the level of suffering in the broader context of 
international society. The state structure makes it difficult enough 
to adopt a perspective that reflects an equal valuation of all peoples; 
when our primary sources of information insinuate through semantic 
relativism that "our own" troubles are tragedies or disasters equiva-
lent to those of the "other"-when clearly they are not-the prob-
lem is further compounded. 
Today's mass media has enabled people to see the reality of the 
human suffering that goes on in distant lands. Unfortunately, the 
perversity of groupist mentality views the suffering of "foreigners" 
with less empathy than it does from the second-hand account of 
some lesser suffering of members of one's own group. A sense that 
the structural impediments to redressing international poverty are 
too great has conspired with a lack of willingness to empathize with 
the suffering of the "international other." The result has been a reac-
tion of numb disregard from much of the "developed" world. 
While such images may foster a greater sense of the "global-vil-
lage," our groupism more than counters this with a sense of "thank-
god-its-not-us" resignation. 
Of course, it is "not us" because we have decided that any civi-
lized society establishes a social safety net whereby the excess 
wealth of its most affluent members is used by the state to assist the 
least affluent members. Underlying such policies is an implicit un-
derstanding that no society can call itself "just" or, indeed, maxi-
mize its collective utility if it allows its weakest members to suffer 
greatly. Yet, the suggestion that international society impose an in-
ternational income tax in order to safeguard against abject poverty 
would likely be met with stares of disbelief and indignant sermo-
nizing about existing levels of domestic taxation from most mem-
bers of affluent groups. 
IV. TOWARD SOLVING THE PROBLEMS 
OFWARAND POVERTY 
1. Structural Reform 
Although frustratingly sparing in detail, Philip Allott insists on the 
need to establish a meaningful form of global government if we are 
ever to bring about an end to human suffering: 
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[E]nforced alienation from each other, the surrender of 
their natural affections and natural loyalties, their subjec-
tion to state societies, which require that they treat other 
human beings as "other," merely because they are subject 
to another state system. 23 
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The desirability, feasibility, and likelihood of the establish-
ment of a system of global governance forms a vast area of debate 
unto itself.24 For the purposes of this paper, I am arguing on a theo-
retical level that in order to escape from the twin banes of war and 
poverty, humanity must implement precisely such an institutional 
revolution. If we are to shed our groupist trappings and the anarchic 
international system to which they are wedded, power must be 
ceded to a body which will advance the interests of all members of 
humanity. 
It is uncertain how we are to "get there from here." Nation-
states might eventually come to recognize the need to forfeit their 
sovereignty to an effective world body, while maintaining a degree 
of autonomy akin to the constituent parts of a federation. A global 
equivalent of the aims of the European Community comes to mind. 
Perhaps the establishment of transnational functional regimes could 
be used to harness state self-interest in such a manner that mutually 
beneficial agreements between states would serve to further our mu-
tual interdependence such that one central government would eventu-
ally seem an inevitability. 
Problems abound with the notion of allowing international gov-
ernance to simply "evolve naturally" in this manner, without a pro-
active approach motivated by a globalist ethos. The existing power 
relations would likely remain unchanged, only to be institutional-
ized. The slow pace of such an "evolution" would, moreover, pro-
long unnecessary human suffering. These two reasons alone are a 
powerful argument why a fundamental rethinking of our relationship 
to the "international other" is needed. This rethinking must take 
place not only in the hearts and minds of the power elites but also in 
those of the individual members of existing nation-states. It must 
23 Allott, supra note 17 at 251. 
24 For a variety of perspectives on this subject, see H. Bull, The Anarchical 
Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); R. Falk, The Promise of 
World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); E. Gellner, Nations 
and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); R. Kothari, Footsteps 
Into the Future (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
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be predicated not on self-interest or self-preservation but rather on 
empathy, generosity, and a desire for greater justice in international 
society. 
2. Revolution of the Mind 
It might be thought as bold as it is thought naive to suggest that the 
two most persistent plagues of humanity could be overcome by in-
dividuals altering their conceptualization of their relationship with 
the rest of society. I submit, however, that precisely such a funda-
mental rethinking is a necessary step to be taken should any lasting 
change be brought to bear on the problems that vex international so-
ciety. 
With the reconceptualization of one's place within the context of 
the rest of humanity, "culture" and "solidarity" take on a broader 
meaning. Rather than implying a "group," these words would be the 
function of the group, humanity. Thus, human "culture" would be-
come, to adopt Webster's definition for culture, "the social and re-
ligious structures and artistic and intellectual manifestations, etc. 
that characterize [humanity]."25 Likewise, "solidarity" would mean 
"common interest and active loyalty within [humanity],"26 rather 
than implying exclusion. 
Change is also required at the institutional level. If it is to be 
lasting and effective, however, political change cannot be simply the 
decree of political elites. Elite-driven institutional reform must in-
form the popular sentiment, and, in a dialectical manner, the popu-
lar sentiment must be clearly communicated to the elites. 
Leadership may dictate that the elites must posit the concept of 
global government in the marketplace of ideas before the popular 
will can respond. As it stands today, the elites of the affluent groups 
(nation-states) lack the courage to advocate moving beyond the state 
system. 
Popular opinion has not been solicited on this question of global 
government. Groupist thinking would, cynics might say, preclude 
its garnering support. Until our power-elites submit it for debate, 
the question remains open. By failing to initiate this debate, our 
leaders send an implicit, yet unmistakable message that 
"globalism" is an untenable and/or undesirable objective. As long 
25 New Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language (Danbury 
Ct.: Lexicon, 1992) at 235. 
26 Ibid. at 944. 
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as the suggestions for real international reform continue to emanate 
primarily from a handful of academics, and not from other more 
powerful leaders of government, business and organized labour, the 
general public will not properly consider the necessary solutions. 
Allott articulates the change which must occur in the hearts and 
minds of the elites and non-elites alike in the following passage: 
In conceiving the structure-system of international soci-
ety, the society of all societies, humanity may find a 
means to choose its own future well-being. Nothing more 
nor less is required than a self willed change in human 
consciousness. A revolution, not in the streets but in the 
mind. 27 
Allott presents a compelling treatise on the need for interna-
tional society to re-create itself; he does not provide a road map of 
how humanity is to reach this new stage in our development. I am 
sympathetic to this reluctance to spell out specific institutional re-
forms; the primary focus of Allot's argument is the need for an al-
teration of the way in which we think about our role in international 
society. 
The fundamental flaw of Eunomia, as R. St. J. Macdonald 
rightly indicates in a thoughtful review of the book, is its failure to 
address the difficult reconciliation of anti-groupism and concern 
for minority interests with which this paper is grappling. 
Macdonald challenges this important omission: 
The question not addressed is whether you can have both 
"national" or "ethnic" -communities within the type of 
community of humanity or the society of societies which 
the author proposes. This is the very question raised by 
many small ethnic or linguistic groups today as they 
struggle to defend their language-culture-identity from 
encroachment from a mass-produced "international" cul-
ture. Allott' s theory remains ambiguous about whether, in 
fact, we can have it all or whether the new international 
society which he proposes will, by creating new possibili-
ties at the international level, foreclose or limit reality at 
the smaller "community" level. 2s 
27 Allott, supra note 17 at 257. 
28 (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 822 at 831. 
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This tension between the clear need for macro-level reforms and 
micro level "realities," to use Macdonald's word, is undoubtedly a 
quandary. Allott identified the tension as the "self-other" 
dilemma. 29 On the one hand he states that members must be dis-
tinguishable to form a society, and on the other hand, he points out 
the connections between such groupist attitudes and xenophobia and 
ethnic and religious intolerance. Thus he merely reinforces the terms 
of the dilemma. 
I contend that at the end of the day, the irreconcilablity of the 
"self-other" dilemma must be overcome. The manner in which one 
resolves this dilemma (assuming one attempts to, unlike Allott), 
will speak volumes about one's intrepidity in arriving at a coherent 
solution when faced with two or more conflicting intuitive senti-
ments. To equivocate persistently (as postmodernists seem to), or 
ultimately to abdicate responsibility by evading the dilemma (as 
Allott does) is not a satisfactory manner of dealing with a question 
of such profound magnitude. 
V. GROUPIST REALITY WITHIN THE STATE 
STRUCTURE 
Making the transition from discussing vaguely utopian-sounding no-
tions about global governance to discussing how to improve the 
conditions for, and accommodate the cultural differences of, mi-
nority groups within existing western nation-states would appear to 
be moving from the realm of International Relations to the realm 
of sociology, philosophy, and domestically-conceived legal and 
political theory. 
The Critical Race Theory branch of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement has produced a variety of approaches to redressing the 
many inequalities that currently confront racial and ethnic minori-
ties within nation-states. Among these approaches there are a number 
of common themes. While there is substantial debate amongst 
Critical Race Theorists, much of the debate, to an outsider, seems 
like semantic exercises in labelling. 
29 Allott, supra note 17 at 56. 
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1. The Dilemma Within the State Structure 
I have already identified war and poverty as being the two major 
sources of human suffering stemming from groupist thinking. The 
fact that these problems exist in international society and that they 
obstruct the maximization of human utility can serve as a reminder 
to keep other sources of disutility in perspective. 
That being said, it is understandable that the injustices which 
exist within states are the focus of much attention. One's energies 
are naturally best expended where one feels one can make the great-
est improvement, and achieving change seems less daunting on the 
domestic level than on the international one. Yet the methodology 
adopted to achieve the positive results at the state level is at odds 
with the methodology necessary to achieve the greater goal of the 
international society. Disempowered minority groups assert their 
distinctiveness to draw the attention of the dominant group within 
their state to the fact that their culture is threatened and that their 
members are not accorded equal treatment. Thus, the accentuating 
of diversity among groups at the state level is presented as the sin-
gle best vehicle for avoiding dominant group cultural encroachment 
and attaining equal status. Meanwhile, at the international level, the 
same approach is a contributing factor to war and the perpetuation 
of the severe suffering of the poorest members of international soci-
ety. 
The spheres of dominance are thus defined by the state system. 
International societal dominance is facilitated by the unequal valua-
tion of the international "other" which derives from the artificial 
separation of peoples. Domestic dominance within states is facili-
tated by allowing a subset of humanity sovereign control over the 
activities within its sphere. The state structure justifies nation-state 
groupism while allowing for the suppression of ethnic minority 
groups. It thus exacerbates groupist tensions on both the interna-
tional and national fronts. 
Current approaches to the accommodation of diverse strategies 
to social organization have all implicitly relied on the state struc-
ture. From the most extreme assimilationist to the most extreme 
form of postmodernist pluralist, all such approaches operate within 
the parameters of this historically rooted conception of the nation-
state. 
No doubt, there is cause for this outlook; we currently live under 
the state system and as much as it may be interesting to speculate 
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about future worlds and global governance, there are very real prob-
lems in today's states and we should not feel bound to focus exclu-
sively on grand holistic global solutions. This is a fair comment. 
However, the role of the academy is to move beyond the institu-
tional and intellectual trappings of our era, and to dream of new 
paths for reaching new tomorrows. If our intellectual elites embark 
on their inquiries exclusively from assumptions defined by our cur-
rent flawed structures, we will fail to transcend those structures. The 
political leadership must be willing to implement necessary 
changes, but if new points of departure do not enter the marketplace 
of ideas because of premature defeatism, the expectation of failure 
will undoubtedly become self-fulfilling. 
VI. JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS FOR STATE 
STRUCTURED GROUPISM 
1. Postmodernism 
Things are going to slide in all directions 
Won't be nothing 
Nothing you can measure anymore 
The blizzard of the world 
has crossed the threshold 
and it has overturned 
the order of the soul. 
Leonard Cohen, "The Future" 
i. Modern Meets Postmodern 
As a theoretical framework, postmodernism stands in marked con-
trast to the natural law/utilitarianism combination which I have 
posited. Displaying the sort of affinity for universal norms, as I 
have earlier in this paper, is considered to be distinctly 
"modernist." Utilization of utilitarian calculus is also viewed as 
merely a historically-rooted construct that could potentially be 
used to discount further the rights of minority groups.30 
30 W. Kymlicka, "Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights" in A. C. 
Hutchinson & L. Green, eds., Law and the Community: The End of Individualism? 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1989) 181 at 191. Kymlicka was countering the notion 
that aboriginal rights claims were somehow contingent on the benefit such 
claims might accrue to all Canadians. 
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Postmodernism can be defined more in terms of what it rejects 
rather than the actual content of what it accepts. This overarching 
framework in which much of the current Critical Legal inquiry is 
situated entails a rejection of grand narratives, universal truths, neu-
tral notions of justice, and culturally-transcendent values, all of 
which are frequently indicted under the blanket label of 
"Enlightenment values." Instead, this school of thought embraces 
ideas such as contingency, diversity, and specificity. 
A thorough inquiry into the merits and failures of postmod-
ernism would comprise another paper. My discussion of postmod-
ernism will be restricted to drawing attention to the significant 
theoretical problems that arises when postmodernism is applied to 
situations requiring political change. 
In my explanation for my belief in universal norms I focussed 
on the problematic nature of theories that reject such norms. It 
would thus appear as though we have two opposing theories, the jus-
tifications of which are sought via the undermining of their respec-
tive antitheses. The reason why this is less problematic for the ar-
gument in favour of the existence of universal norms lies in the 
readiness with which natural law is capable of accommodating and 
transcending the form of epistemological uncertainty which post-
modernism challenges it with. 
ii. Postmodernism as a Scepticism 
The postmodern challenge is essentially sceptical in nature. The 
sceptical posture, within the realm of pure epistemology, disputes 
any possible explication of human knowledge by insisting on a level 
of certainty and verification which is not possible. The believer in 
the capacity of people to possess knowledge must be capable of an-
swering sceptical queries such as "how can you accurately claim to 
know X is true, given that you cannot know you are not merely a 
brain in a vat being fed sensory data in a scientist's laboratory?"31 
The proponent of universal norms can simply concede we never 
truly know anything with absolute certainty. The pursuit of ethical 
inquiry need not require absolute epistemological certainty. The 
human enterprise must, nonetheless, forge ahead and act based on the 
closest approximation of what is viewed as a justifiable belief. Too 
3! I have borrowed this example of a sceptical query from J. Dancy, An 
Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). 
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often, matters are reduced to two choices; either, (1) accept the ex-
istence of universal norms and suppress any epistemological doubt 
which is a part of everyday life, or, (2) adopt a nihilistic perspec-
tive and refuse to accept that it matters one way or another how one 
behaves. While I have clearly indicated a preference for the former 
position, I accept that the latter is at least consistent with the rejec-
tion of culture-transcending norms. 
What is entirely untenable is the approach taken by the ethical or 
legal/political branch of postmodernism as it displays a distinct 
discomfort with accepting the nihilistic implications of its under-
lying rationale. Postmodernism is fundamentally at odds with any 
argument that purports to speak with a voice possessing any moral 
authority. If all Critical Race Theorists were willing to admit that 
their theories were simply about politics (which is of course to say, 
power), they would be more internally consistent. It is tacitly rec-
ognized, however, that such an admission would leave their project 
incomplete, robbing them of any rationale as to why their politics 
are preferable to the politics being challenged. 
Thus, such postmodern attempts at challenging universal norms 
are doomed to either incompletion and unpersuasiveness or contra-
diction and theoretical duplicity. Critical Race Theorists manipu-
late this dilemma in one, or both, of two ways. The first technique 
is to attempt to divorce the "practical" merits of their arguments-
for example, the desire to improve the lives of minority groups in 
society-from the theoretical underpinnings which they espouse, 
thus "avoiding" nihilistic indifference. In the second, the assault on 
the existence of universal norms is followed by the positing of an 
ethical rationale for particular societal reforms, a rationale no less 
susceptible to the criticisms they have directed at universal norms. 
In justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris M. Young showcases 
both of these postmodern obfuscatory techniques.32 This book is 
both widely referred to by other Critical Race Theorists and repre-
sentative of its genre. It is in this sort of postmodern pursuit of 
practical reform that the dilemmas which I have outlined come to 
the fore.33 
32 Young, supra note 4. 
33 Theorists such as Jean-Frans;ois Lyotard and Richard Rorty do not have to 
confront the same predicament as explicitly as theorists like Young who are pre-
scribing a specific approach for the solution of specific problems. 
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Young attempts to use the tools of postmodernism without hav-
ing to answer any of the difficult questions such an approach entails. 
She begins her evasion of such potential difficulties by declaring at 
the outset that, although she intends to draw upon postmodernism, 
Marxism, and Black philosophy, to name a few, "any methodologi-
cal and epistemological issues" raised by her use of these "tools" 
will simply be treated "as interruptions of the substantive normative 
and social issues at hand." 34 Young then lends moral persuasiveness 
to her arguments by suggesting that the values she posits are 
"universalist values, in the sense that they assume the equal moral 
worth of all persons, and that justice requires their promotion for 
everyone."35 By initially embracing a set of philosophical moorings 
only to offer the disclaimer that she is not responsible for any errors 
contained therein, and then continuing to cling to the cornerstone of 
an opposing perspective (universal values), Young has displayed the 
equivocation that her flawed approach necessitates. 
iii. A Strategic Error in Method 
The postmodernist movement in general, and Critical Race 
Theorists in particular, have committed a very serious, if under-
standable, error in their challenge to the existence of universal 
norms. There is a dominant group (voice, narrative, etc.) in our so-
ciety (or in any society). This dominant group does possess a set of 
values. As a function of their dominance, dominant groups will in-
evitably claim that all or some of their culturally specific values 
are, in fact, reflections of a set of universal norms. This might be an 
accurate estimation in some respects, or it might not be such in any. 
The point is, in quite rightly trying to counter this hegemonic 
posture of the dominant group, Critical Race Theorists have not 
been satisfied merely to draw the attention of the dominant group 
to the culturally couched nature of their outlook. The postmodern 
approach has not been content to suggest that the dominant group use 
this self-awareness to appraise critically which of their beliefs do or 
do not present accurate reflections of the universal norms. Rather, it 
has conflated dominant groups' beliefs with the universal norms 
themselves (making the same error as the dominant groups) and thus 
presented an indictment of the existence of universal norms alto-
34 Young, supra note 4 at 8. 
35 Ibid. at 37. 
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gether. Postmodernists have not merely questioned the merit of one 
group's interpretation of universal norms and clamoured to have 
other voices added to the effort to achieve a human ideal. Rather, 
they have dismissed out of hand the entire enterprise of striving to 
attain human ideals, while at the same time elevating the wholesale 
acceptance of the concept of difference to be just such an ideal. 
There is obviously a tremendous challenge posed by the need to 
divorce oneself from one's own perspective and life experiences in 
order to arrive at as close an approximation of a human ideal as 
possible. This is not, however, impossible to carry out. To suggest 
otherwise is to ignore or discredit the efforts of every thinker, 
writer, legislator, or other individual who has ever formulated an 
idea about justice for a group identified as his or her own.36 
iv. On the Value of Difference 
The acceptance of the existence of universal norms need not imply 
the acceptance of a set of rules that do not allow for a degree of con-
textualization. Simply because the norms are pre-determined and 
immutable does not mean one overlooks the degree of specificiry 
with which they have been apprehended at any point in time. Thus, 
the norms are subject to refinement as the natural law is further dis-
covered. They must be understood to be comprehensive, yet flexi-
ble. In other words, although the entire range of human activity is 
subject to the norms, absolute sameness of culture need not follow. 
Flexibility allows for different cultural practices that do not im-
pact adversely on the well-being of others. 
Within the realm of ethics, some cultural differences are prob-
lematic, while others are innocuous. Take two extreme examples: If 
a young Scottish woman derives pleasure from practicing her 
Highland dancing, such a culturally specific manifestation of an ex-
pression of human joy is in no way contrary to my proposition that 
groupism is destructive. On the other hand, the practice in certain 
African countries of subjecting young women to genital mutilation 
36 Another critique levelled at the postmodern approach is put forward by 
Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka takes postmodernists like Rorty and Michael Walzer 
to task for their dismissal of universal norms: "They claim to know such limits 
exist-they claim to know this in advance of the arguments. They claim to know 
that reasons will only be compelling to particular historical communities, 
before these reasons have been advanced." See W. Kymlicka, "Liberalism and 
Comunitarianism" (1988) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 181 at 203. 
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cannot be justified as an expression of a particular (religious) cul-
ture.37 
Agreement that isolated examples of apparent injustices are 
perpetrated under the protective guise of cultural difference need 
not entail acceptance of my thesis that groupism is essentially prob-
lematic.38 However, such an agreement is instructive in displaying 
the ethical neutrality of the concept of difference. Because differ-
ence can manifest itself in any potentially problematic form, it is 
clear that difference is not an ethically relevant concept independent 
of other concepts. It follows that any theory which purports to have 
its ethical foundations in difference and tolerance of difference is on 
extremely unstable footing. 
The empty vessel of difference is capable of being filled by 
anything; indeed, tolerance of difference may manifest itself as tol-
erance of evil. As a correlative of dispensing with universal norms, 
an effective conception of evil has also been sacrificed. The most 
heinous acts are merely "different." Feeding hungry children cannot 
be declared any more objectively to be good than killing them. 
Without some normative guidelines to provide the true criteria for 
the relative worth of a given different perspective, difference for its 
own sake is an ethically irrelevant concept. 
Constructed as it is within the framework of the state structure, 
postmodern discourse on the merits of difference as an instructive 
tool fails to provide an adequate means by which to distinguish the 
beneficial differences from the problematic ones displayed in in-
ternational or state societies. Obviously one cannot ignore the role 
which some differences have played in fostering historical socioeco-
nomic inequalities. By abstracting the concept of difference out of 
the struggle to have diverse racial and gender voices heard, there is 
an implicit importation of content to an essentially empty concept. 
2. Communitarianism 
The debate on the relative merits of individualism and communi-
tarianism has reached such a level that neither side fits into the her-
metically sealed compartments that originally appeared so well 
37 Other, less extreme, culture-specific practices with negative implications 
for women present an interesting challenge to feminist analysis. Universal norms 
may be useful in rejecting an entire class of culturally accepted behaviour. 
38 To reach such a determination it remains necessary to consider the problems 
of war and unequal valuation of other groups. 
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defined. If the labels of pluralism,39 liberalism, and permutations 
like Roberto Unger's super-liberalism are added to the discussion, 
matters become further obscured. The point is that the entire debate 
is among what can be labelled liberal social democrats,40 and little 
or nothing indicating a radical departure is evident. 
The stagnation of the debate is evidenced by the degree to 
which the participants engage in labelling, and re-labelling, differ-
ent variations on the same theme. In the introduction to a recent col-
lection of essays on the individualism-communitarian debate, edi-
tors Allan Hutchinson and Leslie Green concluded none of the con-
tributors-including Will Kymlicka, Mark Tushnet, and Mary Jane 
Mossman-were satisfied that either "the exaggerated individual-
ism contained in many forms of liberalism," or the communitarian 
response, provided fully satisfactory approaches to the groupist 
world in which we live.41 Participants in the debate have taken to 
setting up would-be opponents as straw men and attacking their ar-
guments on the most extreme readings of their proposals. Two ex-
amples of this approach to the debate are found in Charles Taylor's 
writings on "atomism"42 and John Rawls' recent responses to so-
called communitarian critiques of liberalism. 43 Taylor decries the 
overly individualistic approach of liberalism by setting up an ex-
treme form of liberalism that very few liberals would be comfort-
able espousing, or feel compelled to defend. 44 Rawls, for his part, 
simply incorporates-or co-opts-into his liberalism Taylor-esque 
ideas about individual choice-makers being socially situated and, 
thus, defuses the communitarian "threat" to liberalism.45 
At the risk of sounding banal, the individualism-communitar-
ian debate seems to ignore what must surely be the most urgent of 
39 A sub-category has been carved out of communitarianism thought referred to 
by some theorists as "pluralism." This school of thought is virtually 
indistinguishable from other forms of communitarianism and, thus, no less 
groupist in nature. 
40 R. Beiner, "What's the Matter with Liberalism?" in A. Hutchinson & 
L. Green, eds., supra note 30, 37 at 37. 
41 A. Hutchinson & L. Green, "Introduction" in A. Hutchinson & Green, eds., 
supra note 30, 1at7. 
42 C. Taylor, "Atomism" in A. Kontos, ed., Powers, Possessions, and Freedom 
(Toronto: Universiry of Toronto Press, 1979) 39 at 48. 
43 J. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures" 
(1980) 77 Journal of Philosophy 519. 
44 Kymlicka, in A. Hutchinson & Green, eds., supra note 30 at 200. 
45 Beiner, supra note 40 at 39. 
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human projects, namely, the improvement of the lives of the great-
est number of people in the world today. It should be evident at 
this point that, to my mind, any theory which approaches notions of 
community and the relative merits of groupist mentality without 
considering the impact such modes of thought may have on the 
global level of human utility has failed to address adequately a ma-
jor issue in social theory. 
This contention may appear to miss the point. It could be in-
sisted that a globalist perspective is perfectly consistent with a de-
bate about whether the individual is ultimately the source of all 
value or whether this value can only be realized in a community con-
text. However, without taking account of the community context of 
humanity explicitly, and instead focussing on a community context 
within this global family, the participants in the individual-
ism/communitarianism debate miss the point. The unequal valua-
tion of our fellow human beings that groupism both sanctions and 
fosters, and the pernicious effects of its manifestation in the state 
structure, are implicitly accepted by them as the paradigm within 
which this debate operates. 
Viewing this debate from a globalist perspective, an interesting 
inversion occurs. The latent individualism underlying communitar-
ian thought is revealed and the true communitarian character of in-
dividualism is exposed. The focus of state-centered communitarian 
thought on safeguarding and furthering the interests of individual 
sub-sets of humanity can be seen as a logical extension of selfish in-
dividualism. It is driven by a perceived need for personal insulation 
from a threatening "other"-the rest of humanity-and thus reflects 
a self-centered outlook. True individualism, however, is concerned 
with the particular well being of each and every human being; it 
counters the unequal valuation of the "other" perpetuated by a 
groupist mentality and thus results in all people being factored into 
any utilitarian assessment of government structures. Once the state 
structure is recognized as an artificial construct, which we can choose 
to discard, we see the labels currently in use ironically become re-
versed. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: LIVING WITH "THE OTHER" 
Philosophy begins and ends with the question of the other. 
The question of the other is not, of course, a question; it is 
a complex of questions.-Mark Taylor46 
If we consider the relatively brief record of human social 
history, if we consider all that the human species has cre-
ated and done during that brief period, we are struck by 
an extraordinary uniformity in the midst of so much di -
versity. If we consider the total accumulation of religion 
and mythology and philosophy and the plastic arts and 
literature, the whole story of the so-called private life of 
human individuals, we are easily led to the hypothesis 
that there is a pattern of human existing which transcends 
time and place, a pattern which has traditionally been 
characterized as a human nature and a human condition.-
Philip Allott47 
There will always be differences among people. The challenge is to 
retain our difference while shedding the pejorative sentiments we 
tend to identify with "the other." At the same time, we have to con-
sider whether there is too much diversity of otherness in the world 
today. Such a query no doubt raises the spectre of monoculturalism; 
however, the heterogeneity/homogeneity issue need not be conceptu-
alized as a dichotomy. It is more useful to view this difference on a 
continuum; our world is never going to be transformed from its het-
erogeneous state to a homogenous one in some sort of binary transi-
tion. We must be prepared to ask ourselves whether, at this particu-
lar moment in the development of humanity, we have arrived at the 
optimum balance of homogeneity and heterogeneity for the well-
being of the species. The fact that we continue to kill "the other" in 
part because of their "otherness," coupled with our unequal valuation 
of each "other," would suggest that we have not. 
There has been an unfortunate marriage between the positive hu-
man sentiment of tolerance of others and a highly problematic 
school of thought, namely, postmodernism. Because postmodernism 
is doomed to devour itself in any attempt to reconstruct ideals af-
46 M. Taylor, "Introduction: System ... Structure ... Difference ... Other" in 
M. Taylor, ed., Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986) 1 at 4. 
47 Allott, supra note 17 at 69. 
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ter it finishes tearing down the approaches of the past, its usefulness 
is limited. However admirable its goals, the postmodern approach, 
as I have tried to show, is flawed in two fundamental respects. First, 
its rejection of universal norms is both unnecessary and counter-pro-
ductive; dominant groups in society can be made aware of their cul-
tural specificity without arguing against the existence of that which 
has proven to be instrumental in human moral, political, and reli-
gious development. Second, its failure to look beyond the state 
structure has served as a tacit bulwark for a flawed and destructive 
edifice. 
The difficulty of striking a balance between homogeneity and 
heterogeneity is witnessed in the case of aboriginal minority popu-
lations in Canada. While our political leaders are just beginning to 
realize that aboriginal peoples have a right to negotiate constitu-
tional reforms with the federal and provincial governments, their ad 
hoc, visionless approach to this process has, not surprisingly, fostered 
an increase of groupist sentiment. No group will have any desire to 
transcend its own particularities in search of commonalities with 
other groups and universal truths if it is not even afforded the free-
dom to exist as a recognizable entity itself. On the contrary, at-
tempts to "assimilate" difference not only fail to lead to healthy 
integration, they suppress groupist sentiment and heighten a group's 
defensive posture in its struggle to make its voice heard within the 
context of state-structured group domination. 
In Dancing With a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality, Rupert Ross 
has thoughtfully explored this problem, arriving at a view consistent 
with much of what I have advocated in this paper: 
The challenge for native people is identical to the one 
that all people face: expanding the definition of the in -
group so that rules of cooperation, tolerance and respect 
are extended to include everyone on this crowded planet. 
What makes their challenge more immediate and more 
daunting is that they were suddenly required to live side 
by side with their former out-groups in communities 
which were created, by us, almost overnight. They have 
simply not had the time to make the requisite adjust-
ment. 48 
48 R. Ross, Dancing With a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality (Markam, Ont.: 
Octopus Books, 1992) at 157. 
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Is it enough simply to praise such "ideal" sentiments and then 
qualify our agreements ad infinitum with "realist" provisos of the 
impractical reach of such sentiments, the insurmountable impedi-
ments of current power structures, etc.? If we are to alter the poten-
tial unfeasibility of achieving these goals, we must first get beyond 
the "reality" of separate states and the doctrine of state sovereignty 
on which our international system is premised. 
This paper has attempted to counter ideas put forward by 
postmodern thought that there is no such thing as a "human nature" or 
that it is "dangerous" to search for a definition of it.49 This paper 
has attempted to be more optimistic with respect to the merits of 
such an enterprise, yet no more cavalier with respect to the threat of 
being culturally oppressive. It is a challenging exercise to be sure, 
yet one I believe worth engaging in. 
I have attempted to show why strategies for redressing inequal-
ity based upon Critical Race Theories are doomed to fail on their 
own terms both because they are tethered to a flawed methodology, 
and because they tend to operate within a structure that is the source, 
in the international context, of the very injustice they seek to correct 
in a domestic context. 
I have suggested that we embrace the existence of universal 
norms, though not any single source's attempt at ascertaining them 
in their entirety. 
I have deliberately refrained from attempting to design any 
sort of blueprint explaining how we "get there from here," in part 
because too detailed a blueprint may amount to an act of folly. 
That being said, I do not believe that we must resign ourselves to 
Richard Rorty's "banal politics," whereby any approach to social 
reform offering more structure than "people ought to be kinder, 
more generous, less selfish"so is implausible. Perhaps the middle 
ground between large theoretical frameworks and this sort of banal-
ity could lie in the dispensing of our narrow sense of groupism. 
Rather than constructing a new elaborate framework, maybe we 
should simply shed our existing flawed ones. 
While by no means a blueprint, I feel it is possible to identify 
some concrete steps which can be taken toward achieving the goals 
this paper has identified. Progress can be made that would be less 
"unfeasible" or "unrealistic" than the massive overhaul required to 
49 Young, supra note 4 at 36. 
50 R. Rorty, "For a More Banal Politics" Harper's Magazine (May 1992) 21. 
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inject a global ethos into the United Nations. Even that more radi-
cal measure would be more thinkable if the following steps were 
initiated. 
Rethinking the Future 
Perhaps more now than at any other point in history there is a recog-
nition of the destructive effects of "ethnic nationalism." We must 
attempt to build upon this recognition, investigate the bases of na-
tionalism, and expand our understanding of separate groups as a 
defining factor in human civilization. We must look beyond the 
most obvious examples of violence done to "the other"-such as the 
"ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslav republics-and consider 
other challenges facing humanity-poverty, racism, even global en-
vironmental problems-with a view to evaluating how our groupist 
thinking aids or hinders our search for solutions. 
We must ask such questions, not out of some misplaced desire 
to attack groupism for its own sake, nor in order to oversimplify 
complex problems. Rather, this inquiry is motivated by precisely 
what philosophical inquiry is supposed to be about-the questioning 
of assumptions so familiar to us that we fail to recognize how they 
risk being obstacles to the improvement of humanity. 
We must recall the pivotal role played by liberal thinkers in the 
feudal era and of writers and academics in general throughout his-
tory. Perhaps we can develop an assortment of globalist thinkers 
who will influence and be influenced or inspired by political coun-
terparts and possibly even become politically active advocates of a 
globalist ethos. No comprehensive blueprint can be laid out, but we 
can cultivate an environment in which the Philip Allotts of this 
world go from being the occasional idealistic academic and 
diplomat, to being representative of a movement, in which global-
ist ideology is not left to the final lecture in courses on international 
law, but rather comprises entire departments in every major univer-
sity. The finer nuances of the globalist project could then be ex-
plored, just as the creation of women's studies and ethnic studies 
programs have led to greater personal understanding of oneself as a 
marginalized other. Globalist studies would foster a greater under-
standing of the other, and ourselves, by persistent and multi-disci-
plinary emphasis on our commonalities. 
The first steps toward living with the other do not lie exclu-
sively in the realm of academia. In the world of global power poli-
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tics there are realistic, attainable decisions which those with the 
power can implement. 
On November 17, 1994, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea will come into effect after receiving its sixtieth rati-
fication one year earlier. Of the sixty signatures, only Iceland is a 
member of the "developed" nations. The wealthy states are with-
holding their assent partially because of the portion of the 
Convention which details a mildly progressive taxation regime for 
profits to be reaped in the exploitation of the polymetallic nodules 
found in the deep seabed,5 1 the area designated as the "common 
heritage of mankind."52 
The most privileged groups on the planet must learn to accept 
that not even their precious doctrine of state sovereignty can justify 
their insistence upon the world's shared seabed being treated as 
some sort of twenty-first century free market frontier while most of 
the world's population lives in poverty. We must deal with such sit-
uations honestly and acknowledge that the only principle that could 
explain such a shameful power play by the rich is groupist-driven 
greed. 
• • • 
Perhaps Rorty feels he must resign himself to banal politics because 
he is focussing too heavily on traditional economics-supply and 
demand, incentives and rewards. I have stated that such things are 
important and in need of reform. Simply because the structured at-
tempt at economic reform that is (was?) twentieth-century Marxism 
has failed to achieve what it promised, we ought not to conclude a 
more ambitious approach than "people ought to be nicer to one an-
other" is impossible. The recognition that there is some merit 
(however ironic) to the notion that we need rational pursuers of self-
interest to finance the well being of others need not confirm 
"banality." 
5l See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF. 
62/122 (1982), arts. 136-153. 
52 The term "common heritage of mankind," proposed by Ambassador Pardo of 
Malta in a communication sent to the UN Secretary-General in 1967, was in-
tended to describe areas or resources which ought to be "reserved for the collective 
benefit of the global community." See H. Kindred, International Law Chiefly as 
Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 
1993) at 929. 
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Perhaps Marxism "failed" because it was simply too structured, 
too blueprinted. We must realize that there are no blueprints for hu-
man organization. We are not akin to bridges or buildings, we can-
not be manipulated like so many steel beams. Rather, we must have 
the general parameters of our interaction mapped out in a reasonable 
manner by a governing state who will subsequently follow up and 
observe how we shape our own reality. 
In addition to Rorty's short list, perhaps we can expand the list 
of universal "goods" on which we can generally agree to include 
genuine communication, individual equality, security from conflict, 
enough food and shelter to survive, some form of representative 
democratic governance, personal self-reflection, joy, and finally, 
dare it be suggested, love.53 
It is not enough to recognize a number of "nice ideas" and agree 
they should be the goals of global society. It is not enough to pay 
lip-service to certain ideals only to allow their genuine pursuit to 
fall prey to the harsh "truth" of a realpolitik world. Rather, we must 
redefine our reality, before it redefines us. We must recognize the 
realism contained within our idealism, lest we continue to drift in 
slow motion toward an increasingly unjust, violent, and divided 
world. 
Perhaps what is most needed is honesty. Perhaps by honestly ac-
cepting our basic list of things which we can agree are of value to all 
people, we can begin to move in the direction where such values are 
reflected to a greater extent in our world. Perhaps the necessary re-
orientation of international society to the values we share in com-
mon can then begin. This will not be achieved by means of some 
large theoretical framework, nor by resigning ourselves to 
"muddling through." Perhaps what is required is that we act on the 
things we value in an honest, determined way to bring about univer-
sal "goods" for all people. Perhaps we can achieve this together. 
53 Allott dares to refer to the importance of explicitly connecting the concepts 
of justice and love, supra note 17 at 83 and at 403. See also L. Rodriguez-Arias 
Bustamante, "Towards a New Society" in S. A. Avojcanin, ed., Law, Culture and 
Values (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990) 232 at 233. 
